Adam's vision -- Gloomy science -- The severest critic -- On the margins -- Voices in the air -- Grand illusions.

Duncan Foley provides an alternative to Keynesian and 'new classical' macroeconomics, based on the Marxian theory of capital.

This article focuses on the latest developments in mainstream economic theory as of 1999. Changes in economic theory are particularly significant in a period when the Stalinist version of Marxian theory is also in disarray, and the whole question of markets and economic coordination in socialist economies is in practical and theoretical flux. The most important abstract results in the finite-commodity space general-equilibrium theory are that equilibria are locally unique, that is, prices close to but different from the equilibrium prices (...) leave an imbalance between supply and demand, and that a logical link exists between competitive equilibrium allocations and an efficient allocation of resources. A stronger theory of the productive unit can now develop to balance the so far one-sided concentration of theory on market interactions. (shrink)

In "the theory of epistemic rationality" (harvard university press, 1987), Richard foley presents a version of subjective foundationalism designed to avoid aristotle's famous regress problem. This paper explains why foley's theory does not provide an adequate account of the foundations of inferential epistemic justification. Foley's theory neglects the epistemic significance of 'non'belief perceptual states.

We report the results of a questionnaire study on the fair distribution of indivisible goods. We collected data from three different subject pools, first- and second- year students majoring in economics, law students, and advanced economics students with some background knowledge of fairness theories. The purpose of this study is to assess the empirical relevance of various fairness criteria such as inequality aversion, the utilitarian principle of maximizing the sum of individual payoffs, the Rawlsian “maximin” principle of maximizing the payoff (...) of the worst-off individual, and the criterion of envy-freeness (in the sense of Foley 1967). (shrink)

Envy is sometimes suggested as an underlying motive in the assessment of different economic allocations. In the theoretical literature on fair division, following Foley [Foley, D. (1967), Yale Economic Essays, 7, 45–98], the term “envy” refers to an intrapersonal comparison of different consumption bundles. By contrast, in its everyday use “envy” involves interpersonal comparisons of well-being. We present, discuss results from free-form bargaining experiments on fair division problems in which inter-and intrapersonal criteria can be distinguished. We find that (...) interpersonal comparisons play the dominant role. The effect of the intrapersonal criterion of envy freeness is limited to situations in which other fairness criteria are not applicable. (shrink)